Some three centuries ago, during Western Europe's Age of Exploration, there was published a very original and mammoth catalog of "the nature of things." It had been compiled by a Royal Society founder, John Wilkins. It was his pathbreaking Essay Towards . . . Language (1668) . The essay boldly attempted to specify all variants under each category of thing. For example, hundreds of "Manners" were listed, such as ).
Wilkins's Essay is echoed in many later wordbooks (e.g., Roget's Thesaurus) and even encyclopedias, although rarely acknowledged.
His arrangement tried to point from a concept toward its best term. That format is now sometimes called a "nomenclator." But in the three subsequent centuries, the more common format has been its inverse, pointing from a word or term to its meaning. The obvious example of such a "semantic" is the alphabetical dictionary. Indeed, little progress has been made in nomenclators since Wilkins.
But today's computerizing world increasingly faces the problem of extracting experience-based wisdom from each apparently novel circumstance. Therefore today's need, especially in the emergent field of artificial intelligence, is far more for nomenclatoral systems than for merely semantic systems.
One such scheme was recently published under the name of The Wordtree (Burger 1984) . The present author, its editor, was therefore most gratified to find it compared with Wilkins's Essay over many paragraphs in this journal by Michael Lesk (1987) .
On analysis, however, I find that it contains many basic assumptions of computerization practitioners, but not of social science practitioners (sometimes called "telesizers"). Indeed, Lesk's critique can provide an object lesson in the gap, the chasm, between some computerizers and some telesizers.
The present author has been a computer user since about 1950 and has a doctorate in cultural anthropology.
Editor's note: This letter is in response to a review of The Wordtree in Issue 13-1,2 and should have appeared in the following issue, 13-3,4. It was unfortunately omitted from that issue and we only found out about the omission recently.
It would seem valuable to indicate the differences, for they may well be part of computational linguistics' unclaimed turf.
The approach of computational linguistics (CL) to word architecture might, at the risk of oversimplification, be termed mathematical. That of the social scientists may be termed evolutionary and cultural. Anthropology, for instance, must have an inherent interest in CL: symboling is the principal human distinctiveness, and anthropology concenters human distinctions. Linguistics, a consequence of symboling, is usually considered one of the five branches of anthropology. True. As The Wordtree declares in many places, such as page 28, "we extend [to vocabulary architecture,] Niels Bohr's theory of complementarity: Light is both material (e.g., particle) and process (e.g., wave motion) .... But physicists find that they can measure little unless they emphasize one or the other analysis .... "
Bohr's Nobel-winning concept is central to modern science. It led to the realization that if one specifies the exact Iocation of an object, it must be at rest (= Werner Heisenberg's Principle). And that has produced the system of quantum mechanics.
But this crucial scientific bifurcation does not seem to have penetrated linguistics. Non-Wordtree wordbooks routinely intermingle substances (typically, the noun, which the British tradition insightfully terms "substantive" rather than "noun") and process (typically, verbs).
Copyright 1988 by the Association for Computational Linguistics. Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made for direct commercial advantage and the CL reference and this copyright notice are included on the first page. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission.
0362-613 X/88/0100o-o$03.00 S Letter to the EditorBy contrast, The Wordtree has applied to vocabulary, probably for the first time, those principles of hard science first enunciated around the 1910s. The Wordtree consequently argued that a substance may ultimately be defined only in terms of other substances, and a process only via other processes. Therefore we endeavored to gradate the entire language's processes purely in terms of a hierarchy of processes.
Lesk went on to test-use The Wordtree "for an alternative to [the word] to REP-RESENT ..... " and found it slower than Roget. Of course. As our page 24 declared, "We do not claim that 'The Wordtree' is a guide to common speech. To describe the world, use traditional word books. But to maneuver or change the world, use 'The Wordtree' !" And to find an alternative for a word is the static task of description rather than change. For that job, Lesk was sound in preferring a thesaurus.
Sometime, however, he may want to find causes, preventives, or effects of a concept; then he should use a branching nomenclator. For instance, "The Wordtree" lists one tabooing cause as sectarianizing. In lay terms, that means that for one part of the population to be kept off-limits to a certain site or practice, a culture must have been divided into coteries or sects. We do not think that a semantic format can show any such conceptual relationship.
WILKINS'S DISCRETENESS VS. WORDTREE'S CONNECTEDNESS
Another chasm between a computerizer's acceptance of his Essay and a brancher concerns conceptual boundaries. Wilkins perceived each of his (more-or-less words) as being discrete. And it sometimes seems as if CL'ers likewise take each word at its face value, rather than considering the unit transformable into neighboring idea possibilities. By contrast, a branching word system assumes the interrelatedness and indeed the lability of concepts. Our nomenclator does so via geological, biological, and cultural evolution. For example, a vegetable that is motile is, in a generic sense, a kind of bacterium. By contrast, our brancher argued that only a small part of (legitimate) vocabulary has yet been recorded, even in the largest unabridged wordbooks. Processual complexification systems have not been performed previously for an entire language. Therefore our first edition suffers many conceptual gaps, especially in areas like biomechanics. We frequently concede that fact (as on p. 45). The situation resembles the first describer of the color spectrum: he probably could offer only the names of a few basic colors. But gradually the names were found, or invented, for the hundreds of intermediate hues, such as purple.
Our branching system seeks to report those hitherto uncodified names, particularly from the technical lexicon, or technolect. We obtained most of them by the anthropological method of "reporting what the natives say." Hence we were able to list an exact site for each of the 24,600 transitives there distinguished. And that first approach represented 30% more transitive morphemes than in the world's hitherto largest dictionary, the Oxford Unabridged.
Typically, Lesk disliked to vorlauf. But we had evidenced that term to page 207 of a popular-speech reporting journal: One vorlaufs (a ski course) to establish its time and conditions. We believe that its very incorporation into the process system of English will henceforth interdigitate vorlauf with the norm-settings of inanimate matters, such as to calibrate.
Likewise, to Zip-Code-sequence (a mailing) was not our invention, but was noted as detected on page 3 of a 1982 official U.S. Postal Service bulletin. We think that revealing it will fill a semantic gap with the many processes of geocoding that are now emergent in our era of satellites.
In fact, we specified a source for 100% of our transitives, whether printed or broadcast, by page or by minute. Such documentary thoroughness is an unheardof rarity in the field of lexicography. These are not, then, "rare or made-up words." They are the sounds of the real world.
The problem of their strangeness is that lexicography has hitherto been dominated by litterateurs gently raised on what field anthropologists sarcastically call the "verandah" of an ivory tower.
WILKINS'S UNILINEARITY VS. WORDTREE'S MULTILINEARITY
Another misunderstanding between the CL use of traditional word arrangements and the social science tradition concerns the path of complexification. Semantic word systems are straight-line. The dictionary moves from A through Z. And a synonymy, such as Rogers, moves from group 1 through group 1,000. But the world is not merely Aristotelian numerics. Darwin showed over a century ago that complexification proceeds multilinearily (by progenerative branching, "cladistically"). Chimpanzees are our cousins, not our ancestors. The selection of an evolutionary path is multifacto-
rial. An ecological space, or lebensraum, must be
vacant. An organic group must be present at its border. That organism must have a supply of appropriate mutations. In sum, "the course of [biological] evolution follows opportunity rather than plan .... " explained Simpson (1960:160) . "Changes occur as they may and not as would be hypothetically best." That simple observation means that the environment necessarily contains as many factors (and almost surely many times over) as ever can be entered, however automatically, into any computer, however speedy. Computers can, then, never surely predict organic interactions.
But the concept of Darwinism was not present in
Wilkins's time. Indeed, Origin of Species was not even published until seven years after Roget. Thus, preDarwinian hierarchies are mere conglomerates. In that way, Wilkins listed mere "magnitudes" (II:VII) as more complex than "vivaparous animals" (II:V). And Roget listed such powered-system characteristics as "excitability (#825) as far more advanced than such human-only characteristics as "book" (#593). By contrast, using late 20th-century evolutionary concepts, The Wordtree shows the gradual complexification from the most primitive terms, such as spatializing. It covered the stages between mere atomization and vegetation by incorporating modern general systems theory. Thus, Marney and Smith (1964:124-127 We do not say that the step must be done by human hands. Content analysis, for example, may assign probability weightings almost instantly. But we say that such a name-specifying brancher has been lacking, and that
The Wordtree has finally collocated the gradations.
Hence CL should rejoice in the open-endedness offered by a branching word system. It should welcome this emphasis on discovering and integrating current technical lexemes with the long-established, abstract ("inkhorn") words.
CONCLUSION: CL NEEDS APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
The continuing lack of social scientists' input both to this periodical and to the CL discipline is not accidental but significant. We have therefore outlined 5 of the fundaments that applied social science now offers: segregating processual words from substantive words; far more ethnographic reportage of technolect; the connectedness, not discreteness, of terms; the world as branching not unilinear; vocabulary as open-ended not finite; and finally, near-synonyms to be nuanced, not comingled.
When we note some of the major assumptions present in the latter but not the former, we may understand why much of today's CL is technically brilliant but culturally trivial.
Hence Lesk's discussion of the pre-evolutionary
